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Risk: Keeping Ahead of the Curve—A conference summary
by Richard C. Cahill, vice president, Credit Risk Department, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Elijah Brewer III, associate professor 
of ﬁ  nance, DePaul University; Caroline Riley, senior risk project manager, Enterprise Risk Management; and Steven VanBever, lead 
supervision analyst, Supervision and Regulation
The Chicago Fed’s Supervision and Regulation Department, in conjunction with DePaul 
University’s Center for Financial Services, sponsored a conference on March 6–7, 2008. 
The conference brought together bankers, supervisors, and academics to focus on 
comprehensive risk management, an extremely timely topic given the recent ﬁ  nancial turmoil.
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Comprehensive risk 
management can help 
banks mitigate risks earlier, 
increase coordination between 
business units and risk 
disciplines, and strengthen 
regulatory compliance.
After William A. Obenshain, DePaul 
University, opened the conference and 
welcomed participants, Cathy Lemieux, 
senior vice president, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, described how man-
agement of all major banking risks has 
become much more complex and sophis-
ticated in recent years.1 This evolution 
includes the development of comprehen-
sive, ﬁ  rmwide approaches to managing 
risk. While some banks used the long 
period of stellar bank performance before 
the summer of 2007 to invest in improv-
ing risk management, other banks allowed 
risk management to become a lower pri-
ority than it had been. Despite the chal-
lenges of the current environment, 
Lemieux encouraged banks to continue 
to focus on long-term improvements to 
risk management. Doing this should re-
duce downside risks in the near future 
and promote greater ﬁ  nancial stability 
in the long run.
Richard C. Cahill, then vice president, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pro-
vided an overview of the recent subprime 
and credit market turmoil. He also posed 
a series of key questions to set the stage 
for the conference, including: What is the 
role of chief credit ofﬁ  cers?, Is quantitative 
risk management getting too clever for 
its own good?, Can stress testing provide 
useful input to decision-makers?, Do 
current accounting practices still make 
sense?, What is the future of rating struc-
tured products?, Can conﬁ  dence in the 
ﬁ  nancial system be restored?, and Will risk 
management keep ahead of the curve? 
Comprehensive risk management
Cahill also moderated a panel on com-
prehensive risk management (also known 
as enterprise risk management, or ERM), 
composed of three banks’ chief risk ofﬁ  -
cers and an attorney. The chief risk of-
ﬁ  cers were James W. Nelson, Huntington 
Bancshares Inc.; Stephen V. Figliuolo, 
Citizens Republic Bancorp; and Beth D. 
Knickerbocker, Marshall and Ilsley Corp. 
According to Figliuolo, the purposes of 
ERM are to promote regulatory compli-
ance without impeding the sales process; 
to identify, measure, monitor, and man-
age a comprehensive set of risks; to man-
age risk through process improvement, 
a proactive approach, and heightened 
awareness; and to make risk management 
part of the corporate culture. Nelson 
provided additional goals: to proactively 
address risks arising from a changing 
environment; to identify and commu-
nicate risks in an actionable manner; 
and to improve risk/return dynamics.
The three banks have adopted different 
structures to implement ERM. On the one 
hand, Huntington and Citizens Republic 
have opted for a centralized approach. 
On the other hand, Marshall and Ilsley Current practices in structured ﬁ  nance have created serious 
incentive problems that need to be addressed.
uses a more decentralized approach, with 
“risk leaders” and corresponding subject 
matter experts embedded in business 
units, accompanied by a small risk-
management staff at the corporate level.
The panelists identiﬁ  ed a number of 
beneﬁ  ts from adopting comprehensive 
risk management. Some of these are im-
proved risk reduction through earlier risk 
mitigation, increased coordination be-
tween business units and risk disciplines, 
and strengthened regulatory compliance. 
They also identiﬁ  ed a number of chal-
lenges to successful adoption. Senior 
management across the company must 
support and “buy in” to the approach. In 
addition, stafﬁ  ng is difﬁ  cult—i.e., obtain-
ing personnel with both the technical 
skills and the softer skills necessary to 
inﬂ  uence the organization. Finally, the 
subjectivity and uncertainty of risk, com-
pared with the certainty of return, make 
risk mitigation inherently difﬁ  cult.
David M. Simon, an attorney with 
Wildman, Harrold, Allen, and Dixon LLP, 
concluded with a presentation on two 
litigation risks that lenders should 
manage: lender liability claims and the 
preservation of electronic information in 
connection with litigation. Some of the 
lessons learned from the 1980s and 1990s 
about lender liability claims are to adhere 
to internal policies relating to the trans-
action, to ensure contracts are carefully 
drafted and signed, and to adhere to stan-
dards of personal and corporate integrity.
Industry use of risk-management 
instruments
Beverly Hirtle, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, led a session on the banking 
industry’s use of risk-management in-
struments. James T. Moser, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, docu-
mented a direct relationship between 
interest rate derivatives use by U.S. banks 
and growth in their commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loan portfolios.2 More 
speciﬁ  cally, the aggregate use of derivative 
instruments—in particular, interest rate 
options, interest rate futures, and interest 
rate forwards—is associated with higher 
growth rates in C&I loans. This positive 
association is consistent with earlier re-
search ﬁ  ndings that derivative contract-
ing and lending are complementary 
activities. Engaging in derivative activities 
allows banks to lessen their systematic 
exposure to changes in interest rates, so 
they can increase their lending activities 
without increasing their total risk. 
It is uncertain how much banks actually 
use credit derivatives to manage risk 
and whether their credit derivatives 
positions reduce or increase systemic 
risk. Bernadette A. Minton, Ohio State 
University, examined the extent to which 
larger U.S. bank holding companies 
(BHCs) use credit derivatives to hedge.3 
Only 23 larger BHCs out of 395 used cred-
it derivatives. In addition, the typical po-
sition in credit derivatives was for dealer 
activities rather than for hedging credit 
exposures from loans. Overall, the use 
of credit derivatives by banks to hedge 
loans is limited because of adverse selec-
tion, moral hazard problems, and the 
inability of banks to use hedge accounting 
when using credit derivatives. 
Use of derivatives can decrease the effects 
of internal funds volatility on loan growth, 
allowing users to grow loans faster. 
Timothy P. Opiela, DePaul University, 
examined the relationship between loan 
growth and internal funds for BHCs that 
were categorized as users and nonusers 
of derivatives.4 Opiela showed that the 
loan growth of users is weakly related to 
ﬂ  uctuations in internal funds compared 
with that of nonusers. Additionally, the 
internal funds–loan growth relationship 
for users is less responsive to macro-
economic shocks relative to that for non-
users. Past research has shown that BHCs 
that use derivatives have higher loan growth 
than those that do not. Opiela’s results 
showed that an advantage of derivatives 
use is that it weakens the relationship 
between volatile internal funds and loan 
growth. That is, derivatives usage can 
cushion the effects of adverse macro-
economic shocks on this relationship. 
Blurring of credit and capital markets
Brian D. Gordon, senior technical expert, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, dis-
cussed the blurring of credit and capi-
tal markets with panelists Kathryn Dick, 
Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency; 
Jeff Phillips, BMO Capital Markets Corp.; 
and Coryann Stefannson, Federal Reserve 
Board. Gordon began by describing how 
the rise of the “originate-to-distribute” 
model—under which banks originate 
loans for the sole purpose of selling them 
to others—has undermined the tradition-
ally clear distinction between credit risk 
and market risk. Now credit assets are 
common in trading books, greatly com-
plicating risk management.
Phillips outlined the various factors con-
tributing to the recent ﬁ  nancial turmoil, 
including excess global liquidity, the sub-
prime mortgage bubble, and banks’ cre-
ation of structured ﬁ  nance products and 
off-balance-sheet vehicles. He also de-
scribed the “tsunami effect” of investors 
recoiling from risk, as well as the ongoing 
process of deleveraging (i.e., the reduc-
tion of ﬁ  nancial instruments or borrowed 
capital previously used to increase the 
potential return of an investment).
Dick described how, in response to 
changes in the industry, her agency sever-
al years ago merged previously distinct 
units dedicated to credit risk and capital 
markets. She argued that this would im-
prove the quality of supervisory policies 
as well as examiner skill sets. Stefannson 
noted other ways in which bank supervi-
sion was responding to market develop-
ments, such as the Basel II capital accord.5 
The panel discussion centered on the 
uses of ratings by investors and regulators 
and how these might be improved.
One example of the blurring of credit 
and capital markets is the “dual market-
maker.” As Linda Allen, City University 
of New York (CUNY), explained, this 
refers to a ﬁ  nancial intermediary that 
simultaneously serves as a lead arranger 
for a syndicated bank loan and acts as 
an equity marketmaker for the borrow-
ing ﬁ  rm’s stock.6 Theoretical models 
imply that in a competitive market, the informed dual marketmaker becomes a 
natural liquidity provider and helps re-
duce the bid–ask spread in both the equity 
and the loan markets. However, when 
the dual marketmaker becomes an in-
formation monopolist, exploitation of 
an informational advantage could drive 
out other, less informed marketmakers 
and increase spreads.
Allen said that equity markets are more 
liquid in the presence of a dual market-
maker. Her research found evidence for 
a liquidity enhancement effect in the more 
competitive equity market and a negative 
liquidity effect in the less competitive 
syndicated bank loan market with the 
presence of dual marketmakers. Overall, 
the likelihood of a dual marketmaker 
increases with proﬁ  table trading oppor-
tunities in both markets.
Securitization and the mortgage market
Douglas D. Evanoff, vice president, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, moderated a 
panel on securitization and the mort-
gage market. James D. Shilling, DePaul 
University, analyzed moral hazard and 
adverse selection for subprime lending 
and securitization.7 The fact that the ﬁ  rst-
loss position in subprime mortgage secu-
ritizations is no longer necessarily kept by 
the loan originator raises the potential 
for moral hazard and adverse selection. 
This raises the possibility of tiered pric-
ing in the subprime asset-backed secu-
rity (ABS) market    —a process where the 
market attempts to separate originators 
with higher-quality loans from those with 
lower-quality loans.
Shilling noted that his research used 
high loan denial rates to identify sub-
prime lenders with good underwriting 
practices and low loan denial rates to 
identify those with less stringent under-
writing. When these data were matched 
to yields on subprime ABSs and to spreads 
on credit default swaps for home equity 
issuers, the results provided evidence of 
tiered pricing.
Christopher J. Mayer, Columbia University, 
studied agency conﬂ  icts in securitization, 
based on analysis of data from commercial 
mortgage-backed securities.8 Under secu-
ritization, agents perform functions that 
would alternatively be performed by a 
vertically integrated lender with owner-
ship of a whole loan. To alleviate agency 
conﬂ  icts in managing troubled loans, un-
derwriters often sell the ﬁ  rst-loss position 
to special servicers, who handle delin-
quencies and defaults. When holding 
the ﬁ  rst-loss position, special servicers 
appear to behave more efﬁ  ciently. They 
make fewer costly transfers of delinquent 
loans to special servicing, and they liqui-
date a higher percentage of loans.
Despite the advantages of this practice, 
it is not used in residential mortgage-
backed securities, including those backed 
by subprime mortgages. As a result, ser-
vicers of subprime mortgages are seriously 
conﬂ  icted. They earn low fees and have 
no “skin in the game.” To mitigate in-
centive problems, Mayer recommended 
that servicers should be encouraged to 
sell mortgages whenever possible. In ad-
dition, he argued that the government 
should help in restarting the residential 
mortgage market and reﬁ  nancing as many 
viable loans as possible. Finally, when the 
securitization market returns to normal, 
servicers and originators must be given 
a stake in the outcome of their work.
According to Joseph R. Mason, Drexel 
University, many of the current difﬁ  -
culties in residential mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralized debt obli-
gations arose because of a misapplication 
of agency ratings.9 The large ratings 
agencies often have an array of conﬂ  ict-
ing incentives. Furthermore, the process 
of creating these securities requires the 
rating agencies arguably to become 
part of the underwriting team, leading 
to legal risks and even more conﬂ  icts. 
In addition, there are fundamental dif-
ferences between rating structured ﬁ  -
nance products and rating traditional 
products such as corporate debt. One 
of Mason’s policy recommendations is 
to remove the quasi-ofﬁ  cial status given 
to the agencies’ structured ﬁ  nance rat-
ings by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) and the Basel II 
capital standards; the ratings’ current 
status encourages investors to rely un-
critically on them. Another recommen-
dation is to increase supervision of the 
rating agencies as a condition for relying 
on their ratings.
Looking ahead
In a keynote address, Eric S. Rosengren, 
president and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston, offered some “early lessons” 
from the ongoing ﬁ  nancial turmoil.10 
He suggested that markets need to dif-
ferentiate ratings on assets such as cor-
porate securities from ratings on assets 
whose ratings histories and price drivers 
may be quite different (and less well un-
derstood), e.g., certain mortgage-related 
securities. He also suggested that, if 
housing prices continue to fall, policy-
makers will need to increasingly consider 
programs for those with negative as well 
as positive equity in their houses. Finally, 
in light of recent difﬁ  culties in pricing 
complex ﬁ  nancial instruments, he ques-
tioned whether such complexity was nec-
essary and whether some instruments 
should be more standardized or possibly 
moved from dealer markets to exchange-
traded instruments. 
Another keynote speaker, Craig S. 
Donohue, CEO, CME Group, high-
lighted the risk-management advantages 
of exchange-traded products that utilize 
central counterparty clearing services. 
He linked the recent ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
and the large loss announced by French 
bank Société Générale to certain common 
characteristics. These include opaque 
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a limited, bilateral trading model that 
limits liquidity during market stress; and 
a weak control environment. According 
to Donohue, these problems exist in 
part because investment banks have re-
sisted a more centralized, transparent 
execution system for these products.11
The ﬁ  nal conference panel featured 
Edward Kane, Boston College, who 
placed some of the responsibility for the 
current ﬁ  nancial turmoil on the break-
down of supervisory and counterparty 
incentives along the entire chain of struc-
tured securitization.12 He analyzed how 
regulatory competition encouraged su-
pervisors, with conﬂ  icted incentives, to 
outsource much of their disciplinary role 
to credit rating ﬁ  rms. At the same time, 
this competition encouraged banks to 
securitize their loans in ways that pushed 
credit risks into areas of the ﬁ  nancial 
markets where supervisors and ratings 
ﬁ  rms could not see them. He called for 
establishing accountability for measuring 
and managing the size of safety-net sub-
sidies as a way to remedy breakdowns in 
supervisory ethics.
According to Jason H. P. Kravitt, of Mayer 
Brown LLP, while the securitization mar-
ket is now massive in asset size, it consists 
of a relatively small group of people. As in 
most capital market segments, many who 
work in this area are young and lack his-
torical knowledge. Many compensation 
incentives are biased toward the short 
term. Dispersion of risk has kept individ-
ual banks from failing, but it has exposed 
the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole to risks that 
used to be concentrated in a smaller num-
ber of ﬁ  nancial institutions. Going for-
ward, Kravitt predicted a return to credit 
basics and a more transparent, less com-
plex market, with a smaller (but still 
highly important) role for securitization.
Stuart I. Greenbaum, Washington 
University, outlined some features of a 
“new age of risk management.” He ex-
pects ERM, which was encouraged by the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and other 
accounting requirements at publicly held 
companies, to become increasingly prom-
inent at companies of all sizes. He also 
called attention to the roles that the U.S. 
budget deﬁ  cit, trade deﬁ  cit, and mone-
tary policy played in creating a context 
for recent events.
In concluding comments, moderator 
Arthur G. Angulo, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, highlighted the challenge 
for supervisors to simultaneously mitigate 
short-term aspects of the ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
and determine lessons learned for the 
longer term. He predicted the following 
issues would play a key role in the months 
ahead: mortgage origination, the role 
of the chief risk ofﬁ  cer, disclosures to 
investors, and capital regulations (in-
cluding their potential procyclicality).
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